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Our moral theory faces a conceptual dilemma. On the one hand, our concept of a moral 
agent is vague. As a result, our moral theory is explanatorily limited in the borderline cases for 
this concept. On the other hand, if we precisify this concept, we are forced to accept moral 
arbitrariness. After introducing this dilemma, I defend a solution. We should replace our 
categorical concept of moral agency with more precise and scalar concepts of moral agency. By 
deploying these scalar concepts, we can enhance our moral theory’s explanatoriness while 
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It can be vague when an individual is a moral agent.1 For example, consider Al who begins his 
final decade an agent but by the end is no longer an agent.  
Al’s Final Decade: At seventy, Al has a rich sense of what he cares about, and this guides 
his decisions. But Al is in the twilight of his life. After seventy he gradually begins to 
experience the effects of dementia, and his capacity to reflect on and be guided by his 
values slowly decays. He remembers fewer and fewer things and makes fewer and fewer 
plans. His conception of the good life slowly dims. By eighty his body remains intact, but 
it is empty—Al, the once vibrant agent, is gone.  
Al’s cognitive abilities decline steadily throughout the decade.2 In particular, his abilities to 
reflect on how to live and to act on the basis of those reflections decline throughout the decade. 
These cognitive abilities involve reasoning about what to do, and so we will refer to them as 
rational abilities or capacities.3 Because the decline of Al’s rational capacities is gradual, 
 
1 Some theorists of vagueness may bristle at my failure to always explicitly identify the bearer of vagueness as a 
representational device (e.g., a word, a concept). When I fail to explicitly identify a representational device as the 
bearer of vagueness, I am only loosely speaking for the purposes of writing more conversationally. It is possible to 
interpret these conversational sentences in a way that explicitly identifies the bearer of vagueness as a 
representational device, without changing anything of importance to the arguments of the essay. Later in the essay, I 
will at times explicitly identify the bearers of vagueness as representational devices.  
 
2 Al’s final decade is very much a hypothetical case since many actual cases of dementia do not involve uniformly 
gradual declines in cognitive capacity but rather a messy variation of better and worse days. Nevertheless, this 
hypothetical is useful for our purposes in studying agency, and moreover, reflecting on it may lead back to some 
conclusions about agency in more realistic cases of dementia.  
 
3 I do not mean to commit myself to any controversial analysis of agency by taking it to depend on rational 
capacities. As we will see later, it is common ground among a number of moral theorists that agency depends on the 
capacities to reflect on how to live and to act accordingly. I follow these moral theorists in taking this view, but what 
is ultimately important for my purposes is that agency depends on something (e.g., a cognitive ability) that comes in 
degrees, not that agency rests on some specific rational ability or another. I will assume that such abilities do in fact 




intuitively there is no sharp cutoff point that we can identify such that Al is an agent before but 
not after it. Al’s agency will be vague for some days (say) in the middle of his last decade. These 
are borderline cases of agency, where we are not able to say reasonably one way or the other 
whether Al is an agent. 
It is not an accident that Al’s agency is vague. If it were precise, then there would be a 
sharp cutoff day such that up to it Al is an agent and after it Al is not an agent. But the day to day 
changes to Al’s rational capacities are gradual and minor, and Al’s agency has deep moral 
importance. Whether Al is an agent determines whether he is responsible and accountable for his 
actions and whether he can exercise the normative powers. Accordingly, it would seem 
inexplicable and arbitrary if some particular day were the sharp cutoff point for Al’s agency. 
Thus, to the extent that we want to avoid moral arbitrariness, Al’s agency looks like it must be 
vague. But given that this concept is vague, there are borderline cases for it, and in those 
borderline cases we cannot appeal to agency to explain certain facts (e.g., concerning 
responsibility and the normative powers). I will argue that explaining these facts is part of the 
explanatory role we want agency to play in our moral theory. So if our concept of agency is 
vague, our moral theory will be explanatorily diminished.  
Our moral theory is left in a dilemma. On the one hand, our current concept of agency is 
vague, and its explanatory scope is consequently limited by borderline cases.4 On the other hand, 
if we tried to develop a more precise concept of agency, we would apparently be forced to accept 
 
4 Throughout I will speak of a concept’s explanatory role and its explanatoriness. Strictly speaking, of course, it is 
only a set of concepts and a theory as a whole that explain. Nevertheless, we may speak of the explanatoriness of 
single concepts in light of their contribution to the explanatoriness of theories overall. Compare a truth conditional 
semantics on which sentences are the original bearers of truth conditions and so meaning; we may similarly speak of 




moral arbitrariness. In either case, given our current concept of agency, our moral theory is 
seriously disadvantaged.  
On the view I will defend, this conceptual dilemma arises when we deploy the categorical 
concept of agency. In response to the dilemma, I will argue, we should replace the categorical 
concept of agency with scalar concepts of agency. We can deploy precise scalar concepts of 
agency without drawing sharp but arbitrary cutoffs. Thus, we can deploy a more precise concept 
after all, without having to pay the steep price of accepting moral arbitrariness. We can grab the 
second horn of the dilemma without being impaled on it. The solution to the dilemma is to 
change what kind of concepts we deploy in moral theory.  
The change in what concepts of agency we deploy is not so radical as to fundamentally 
alter the topic of moral theory. We continue to think about agency, whether we deploy 
categorical or scalar concepts.5 These distinct concepts can be about one and the same topic. For 
instance, HOT and WARMER are both about temperature. But if we have been deploying only HOT, 
then it would be a conceptual change to deploy WARMER. Similarly, there are categorical and 
scalar concepts of agency, and if we have typically deployed the categorical concept (as I will 
later argue), then it would be a conceptual change for us to replace this concept with scalar 
concepts of agency. In changing from a categorical to a scalar concept of agency, we have not 
replaced our concept of agency with a concept of something else entirely. We are still thinking 
about the same topic but in a different, arguably more precise way. In this way, my proposed 
conceptual change is rather modest. I accept that our concept of agency should play a central role 
 
5 Recall P. F. Strawson’s change of topic worry for Rudolf Carnap’s project of explication. Strawson worried that 
even if explicated concepts are more precise, they will not be about the same topic: either we retain the vague 
concept, or the topic of our theory will change. I assume that we can individuate the topic of theory sufficiently 
broadly: we pick it out under the heading “agency.” Accordingly, we can compare different kinds of concepts of 
agency, from the categorical to the comparative and quantitative. See P. F. Strawson, “Carnap’s views on conceptual 
systems versus natural languages in analytic philosophy,” in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. P. A. Schilpp (La 




in our moral theory, but I propose that instead of the categorical concept, the scalar concept is the 
best fit for this role.  
 On my framing, then, the conceptual dilemma raises the question of whether we should 
deploy different, more precise and explanatory concepts for the purpose of moral theory. This 
question is a special case of a more general question about which concepts to deploy in 
theorizing about the world. The concern here is which concepts to deploy for the purposes of 
developing an adequate theory. Consequently, our answer will be guided by which concepts 
make for a virtuous theory. We want concepts that are representationally powerful (e.g., they 
enable us to represent what is the case). But, more importantly for our current purposes, we want 
concepts that are explanatorily powerful. If our theory is explanatorily limited, this may be due 
to defects in our concepts, and so it is natural to conclude that we may do better by deploying 
different concepts in theorizing. 
Here is the plan for the paper. In Section I, I introduce the categorical concept of agency, 
the paradigm concept of agency in moral theory, and I argue that there exist borderline cases of 
agency for this categorical concept. In the subsequent section, I argue that this leads to the 
conceptual dilemma. Finally, in Section III, I defend a solution to the dilemma: we should deploy 
scalar (i.e., comparative and quantitative) concepts of agency. I argue that these scalar concepts 
are more precise than the categorical concept, and I show how deploying them leads to a more 
explanatory moral theory. I consider three objections in Section IV, and I conclude in Section V. 
1. The Categorical Concept of Agency 
We use categorical concepts to categorize or classify a domain of individuals. For instance, a 
categorical concept of agency classifies individuals into agents and non-agents. Whether such 




deploy a categorical concept of agency. Kant, for instance, sharply distinguishes agents or 
persons from things.6 For Kant, agents place limits on us because they possess a rational nature. 
Roughly, they are able to set and pursue their own ends. A related categorical concept of agency 
is reflected more recently in the structure of John Rawls’s and Thomas Scanlon’s moral 
theories.7 For Scanlon, only agents are morally accountable to each other: morality demands that 
we be able to justify our actions to other moral agents.8 To be an agent, on Scanlon’s view, one 
must have a capacity to reflect on and evaluate one’s actions and act on the basis of those 
reflections.9 For both Kant and Scanlon, agency plays an important role in determining what 
individuals owe to one another. For Rawls, there is also a sharp distinction between non-agents 
and agents. But this distinction plays a different role in Rawls’s moral theory: it informs Rawls’s 
account of what society owes to its citizens. Only agents have a place in the original position, 
where they agree on principles of justice to govern society. On Rawls’s view, agents are those 
who have the capacities to form a conception of the good and to be guided by principles of 
justice.10 
 The details of Kant’s, Rawls’s, and Scanlon’s view of agency differ, and there are also 
differences in their theoretical interests. But there is a common core to all three. To have the 
moral status of an agent, an individual must have the capacities to reflect on how to live and to 
 
6 For instance, see Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996): G4:429. 
 
7 Joshi has recently argued that the categorical approach is required by the structure of Rawls’s and Scanlon’s moral 
theories, and I am indebted to him for this point. See Hrishikesh Joshi, “What’s Personhood Got to Do with it?” 
Philosophia 48 (2020): 563–4. 
 
8 Thomas Scanlon, “The Significance of Choice,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Delivered at Brasenose 
College, Oxford University: May 16, 23, and 28, 1986): 173. 
 
9 Ibid., 174. 
 




act on the basis of these reflections.11 Moreover, whether an individual has the status of a moral 
agent determines whether they are answerable to the demands of morality. The categorical 
concept of agency thus plays a central role in these moral theories. 
It is not a coincidence that agency has played a central role in some of our most 
prominent moral theories. We want it to play a central role in any moral theory. It is 
platitudinous that we hold certain individuals morally responsible and so praise or blame them 
(partly) because they are agents. In other words, we should accept that agency is a partial 
explanatory ground of responsibility and the reactive attitudes. Moreover, it is platitudinous that 
agency is similarly a partial explanatory ground of the valid exercise of the normative powers: 
individuals can consent to certain forms of treatment and promise to act in certain ways (partly) 
because they are agents. Whatever the details of our favored moral theory, we want it to 
vindicate these platitudes, and thus we want agency to play a central explanatory role in our 
moral theory.  
One might try to vindicate the platitudes by deploying a categorical concept of agency. 
For example, consider the following categorical principles.  
Responsibility: An individual is morally responsible for some behavior only if, and partly 
because, they are an agent. 
Blameworthiness: An individual is blameworthy for some bad behavior only if, and 
partly because, they are an agent.12 
 
11 I am inclined to think that just about any plausible conceptual analysis of agency will ground it in the rational 
capacities. But all that is essential, for the conceptual dilemma to arise and for my solution to be viable, is that the 
ground of agency comes in degrees, whether that ground is rational capacity or something else.  
 
12 If some individual is not an agent, then they are exempt from being responsible, blameworthy, and so on. It is a 
separate issue whether some agent, on some particular occasion, has an excuse from being held responsible. The 
question of exemption, of whether some individual is a moral agent, is prior to the question of whether they have an 
excuse. Only agents can have excuses. Overall, then, non-agency prevents responsibility, blameworthiness, and so 




Normative Powers: An individual can promise and consent only if, and partly because, 
they are an agent.  
Overall, then, we have seen that categorical concepts of agency have played an important role in 
moral theory. Moreover, we want our moral theory to vindicate certain platitudes about agency, 
and the categorical concept of agency might look fit for vindicating these platitudes and ensuring 
agency a central explanatory role in our moral theory. 
2. The Conceptual Dilemma 
In spite of agency’s moral centrality, it can be vague when an individual is an agent, and this 
leads to the dilemma sketched in the introduction. Recall our case from earlier:  
Al’s Final Decade: At seventy, Al has a rich sense of what he cares about, and this guides 
his decisions. But Al is in the twilight of his life. After seventy he gradually begins to 
experience the effects of dementia, and his capacity to reflect on and be guided by his 
values slowly decays. He remembers fewer and fewer things and makes fewer and fewer 
plans. His conception of the good life slowly dims. By eighty his body remains intact, but 
it is empty—Al, the once vibrant agent, is gone.  
At seventy Al is clearly a moral agent who is responsible and accountable for his actions, and by 
eighty Al is clearly not an agent.13 But for many days in between, the borderline cases, it is hard 
to say whether Al is an agent. We could fix, for each day, an exact record of what Al can reflect 
on and which reflections he can act on the basis of. In short, we could have all the psychological 
 
distinction, see P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1–25; 
Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in Responsibility, 
Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, 256–286, edited by Ferdinand Schoeman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
 
13 Of course it is plausible that throughout Al’s final decade he remains a moral patient. I am interested, rather, in 
whether he has the further moral status of a moral agent. Vagueness in moral agency raises distinctive questions 
about responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the normative powers. On vague moral patients and a scalar approach 




facts about Al; we could know exactly to what degree Al retains those rational capacities on 
which agency depends. But we would remain in ignorance about whether Al is an agent. For Al 
to be an agent requires a minimal degree of rational capacity.14 But whether Al’s degree of 
rational capacity is enough is vague in the borderline cases.15 
2.1 The First Horn of the Conceptual Dilemma 
In the borderline cases for Al’s agency, we lack the ability to apply the concept AGENT, and this 
inability would persist even if we explicitly filled in all the facts about Al’s rational capacities. 
This is an important property of vagueness. It limits our ability to apply concepts and 
accordingly to provide explanations.  
(*) When it is vague whether an individual is an agent, we are not able to settle on the 
judgment that the individual is (not) an agent, and so we are not able to appeal to agency 
to explain facts about responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the normative powers.16 
 
14 I do not mean to identify vagueness with any kind of ignorance. Rather, I am treating ignorance as one standard 
hallmark of vagueness. I would like to remain as neutral as possible on what vagueness consists in and on what 
characterizes vagueness (whether, for instance, it is semantic indeterminacy or ignorance or something else).  
 
15 There will be substantive disagreements among moral theorists about what counts as enough rational capacity for 
agency. For instance, Rawls takes a liberal approach here, wanting to count any degree of rational capacity as 
enough—see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 443–444. (It is worth noting that it is natural to read Rawls’s liberal 
approach here as motivated by wanting to protect moral patients, and to that extent Rawls’s view will be orthogonal 
to my interests which are distinctively centered around moral agents.) In contrast, other theorists—arguably 
Scanlon: see Scanlon, “The Significance of Choice,” 174—will have more stringent standards for the requisite 
degree of rational capacity. Whether the threshold of rational capacity for agency is higher or lower, however, its 
location will often be vague, as Rawls recognizes—see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 445. 
 
16 Overall I am relying on two observations about vagueness: (1) in the borderline cases, we cannot reasonably settle 
on certain judgments, and (2) our ability to deploy the vague concept is accordingly limited. There are a number of 
substantive accounts—semantic, epistemic, and ontic—of what vagueness consists in, but beyond assuming that 
they fit these two observations, I will remain largely neutral on the nature of vagueness. The most popular semantic 
account is supervaluationism. For classic developments of supervaluationism see Bas van Fraassen, “Singular 
Terms, Truth Value Gaps and Free Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 63, no. 17 (1966): 481–95; David Lewis, “Logic 
for Equivocators,” Noûs 16, no. 3 (1982): 431–441. For development of a supervaluationist approach to reasoning 
about what to do, see J. Robert G. Williams, “Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy,” Philosopher’s Imprint 14, 
no. 4 (2014): 1–34; “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values,” Ratio XXIX, no. 4 (2016): 412–433. The classic 
presentation of epistemicism is Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994). Ontic accounts have 
historically been less popular, but recently they have begun to receive more support in the literature. For a 





When AGENT has borderline cases, we cannot appeal to it to explain facts about responsibility, 
blameworthiness, and the normative powers in those borderline cases. To illustrate, consider the 
following case. 
Al’s Vague Responsibility: Suppose that in the middle of Al’s final decade—when Al’s 
agency is vague—he drives his car and, due to negligence, kills a pedestrian. 
I take it that there are certain data about this case that we want our moral theory to explain. 
Intuitively, Al has some degree of responsibility for wrongdoing in this case. On the one hand, 
he is less responsible than he would have been had he negligently killed a pedestrian in the 
beginning of the decade when he is clearly an agent. On the other hand, he is more responsible 
than he would have been had he negligently killed a pedestrian at the end of the decade when he 
is clearly not an agent. Similarly, consider a case involving the normative powers.  
Al’s Vague Promise: Suppose that in the middle of Al’s final decade, he says he will give 
his daughter, Beatrice, a ride to the airport so that she can make an important job 
interview. But he ends up cancelling at the last moment for no good reason. Beatrice 
misses her flight and does not get the job. 
There are again certain data here that we want our moral theory to explain. It seems that Al’s 
promise would be more valid or weightier when he makes it earlier in the decade, and it would 
thus be worse for him to break his earlier promise. Later in the decade, Al’s promise would not 
seem to generate as strong a reason for him. The reason generated by Al’s promise appears to 
gradually decline as we move through the decade. Accordingly, it would seem less bad for Al to 
break his promise later in the decade.17 
 
17 An objection here might be that Al’s promise is not less valid but rather he is more excused later in the decade. On 
this objection, our reaction to the case tracks not the degree of validity to Al’s promise but rather Al’s degree of 
blameworthiness for breaking it. One reason this objection is misguided is that in the relevant range of days Al’s 




 In borderline cases for the categorical concept of agency, there are a number of data 
about responsibility, blameworthiness, and the normative powers. However, since we cannot 
deploy the categorical concept in these borderline cases, we cannot appeal to it to explain the 
data, and our moral theory will be explanatorily limited accordingly. This gives us the first horn 
of the conceptual dilemma: when agency is vague, we cannot use it to explain facts about 
responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the normative powers.  
2.2 The Second Horn of the Conceptual Dilemma 
Al’s final decade contains borderline case of agency because we cannot precisely draw a line, 
giving a precise threshold for how much rational capacity agency requires. If we could point to a 
precise threshold for agency, then we could single out a pair of days where, on the former, Al is 
determinately an agent and, on the latter, Al is determinately not an agent. But there is pressure 
against this kind of line drawing in Al’s final decade. Agency is a significant moral matter: 
whether an individual is an agent determines whether they are accountable for their conduct and 
whether they are able to exercise the normative powers. As a result, it is hard to accept that Al’s 
agency could turn on a slight, gradual change in rational capacity between a given pair of 
consecutive days: any such change seems too insignificant to ground a significant change in 
agency.18 Moreover, since the pairs of consecutive days are so similar to each other, it is hard to 
choose one pair, singling it out to show that the concept AGENT applies to the former but not the 
 
is not to what degree he has some excuse but to what degree he is exempt from being held accountable for his 
conduct in the first place. The question of whether he is a rational agent or whether he is exempt is prior to the 
question of whether he has an excuse. On this point, see fn. 12 above. 
 
18 In other words, our categorical concept of agency is tolerant to the slight changes between consecutive days (i.e., 
if it applies on one day, it will also apply on the next). The terminology of “tolerance” is due to Crispin Wright, 
“Language Mastery and the Sorites Paradox,” in Truth and Meaning, edited by Gareth Evans and John McDowell 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976): 229. For an argument against the moral acceptability of moral predicates 
like “deserving to go to heaven” being intolerant, see Theodore Sider, “Hell and Vagueness,” Faith and Philosophy 
19 (2002): 58–68. On this point, and for an overview of moral vagueness, see Tom Dougherty, “Vague Value,” 




latter day.19 Any such choice seems unacceptably arbitrary, and when Al counts as a moral agent 
should not be arbitrary. If it were arbitrary that Al is an agent on one day but not the next, we 
would not be able to appeal to Al’s agency to provide a deep, satisfactory explanation of facts 
about his responsibility and exercise of the normative powers on those days. Derek Parfit nicely 
captures this idea when discussing the prospect of precisifying our categorical concept of 
personal identity:  
We must pick some point [...], up to which we will call the resulting person me, and 
beyond which we will call him someone else. Our choice of this point will have to be 
arbitrary. We must draw this line between two neighbouring cases, though the difference 
between them is, in itself, trivial. [...] But, since our choice was arbitrary, it cannot justify 
any claim about what matters. If this is how we answer the question about my identity, 
we have made it true that, in this range of cases, personal identity is not what matters.20  
 
Similarly, in our context, we might try to draw a sharp line between two consecutive days in Al’s 
final decade, saying that on the former, but not the latter, day Al is an agent. But this choice of 
days would be arbitrary, and we would have to admit that when one is an agent turns on a trivial 
and arbitrarily selected difference in rational capacity.21 In this case, agency would not be able to 
play an explanatory role in our moral theory. We could no longer be able to appeal to agency to 
provide satisfying explanations of when Al is accountable for his conduct and able to exercise 
 
19 I use small caps to mention concepts, quotations to mention words, and italics for emphasis.  
 
20 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 241. 
 
21 These observations speak against resolving vague agency by stipulation. It may be promising to resolve other 
kinds of moral vagueness in other ways, however. For example, Tom Dougherty argues that certain kinds of moral 
vagueness can be eliminated by exercising the normative powers. (See Tom Dougherty, “Moral Indeterminacy, 
Normative Powers and Convention,” Ratio XXIX, no. 4 (2016): 448–465.) For example, suppose B promises to A to 
perform some action, but it ends up being vague whether B has in fact performed the action and kept their promise 
to A. In such a case, A could remove any vagueness about whether B broke the promise by releasing B from the 
promise. This strategy is promising for resolving some kinds of moral vagueness and reducing the amount of moral 
vagueness that obtains in the actual world (though it cannot change whether there is moral vagueness in certain 
hypothetical cases, like the ones where A never releases B from the promise). But this strategy is not promising 




the normative powers. Though agency would be precise, its precision would come with the cost 
of explanatory irrelevance.  
We are now in a position to appreciate the force of the conceptual dilemma for agency. 
On the one hand, when agency is vague, we are also explanatorily limited; we cannot reach 
judgments about agency, and thus we cannot appeal to it to explain facts about agency, 
responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the normative powers. On the other hand, there are 
moral pressures against making categorical agency precise. If agency were precise, we would be 
committed to arbitrary facts about when individuals are agents, and this arbitrariness prevents 
satisfying explanations of facts about responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the normative 
powers.  
3. Resolving the Conceptual Dilemma 
Ideally, we want a moral theory on which agency is precise and able to play an explanatory role 
in our moral theory. Naturally, we may want to replace our categorical concept of agency with a 
more precise, explanatory concept. We should consider replacing the vague categorical concepts 
with scalar (i.e., comparative or quantitative) concepts. In introducing his project of explication, 
Carnap observed that scalar concepts are often more precise and theoretically fruitful than 
categorical concepts. For instance, in studying temperature, scientists might replace the 
categorical concepts HOT, COLD with their more precise scalar counterparts.22 In my view, a 
similar strategy is promising for moral theory. 
We have seen that categorical concepts of agency have played a leading role in moral 
theory. However, there are other kinds of concepts of agency that we may deploy in moral 
theorizing: the comparative and quantitative concepts. I will refer to both kinds of concepts as 
 





“scalar” since they correspond to scales. Comparative concepts fix an ordinal scale or a ranking, 
and quantitative concepts fix a cardinal scale. For instance, a comparative concept of agency 
fixes a ranking of individuals in terms of who is more or less of an agent. By deploying it, we 
can therefore answer questions about whether one individual is more or less of an agent than 
another individual. A quantitative concept of agency fixes a measure of to what degree an 
individual is an agent. We might assume for simplicity that degrees are real numbers between 0 
and 1. But this assumption is not essential; strictly speaking we could work with many sets of 
numbers (e.g., the natural numbers, the integers, rational numbers in the unit interval) as long as 
they enable us to assign quantities to the variations in agency between individuals.23 
There is a natural motivation for deploying scalar concepts of agency. Of course scalar 
concepts of agency are grammatically expressible in English: we may speak of an individual 
being more or less of an agent, and we may speak of the degree to which they are an agent. But 
more importantly, the ground of agency, rational capacity, is scalar, and this results in it making 
sense to deploy these concepts. Because one can have greater or lesser degrees of rational 
capacities, one can similarly be an agent to a greater or lesser degree.  
Using the comparative concept of agency, for instance, we can compare Al’s agency on 
one day to his agency on another day. In particular, we can clearly see that Al is less of an agent 
later in his final decade and more of an agent earlier in his final decade. It may seem less clear 
whether the quantitative concept is apt. It is often unclear to what degree an individual is an 
agent because it is often unclear to us to what degree they possess the rational abilities (e.g., to 
remember, to plan, to act) on which agency depends. However, to focus on vagueness in our 
 
23 One question here is whether the scale is a closed interval, with numbers for the greatest and the least degrees of 
agency. At this stage, I would like to remain neutral on this question. What matters most for my proposal is that 




concept of agency, in Al’s final decade I assume that we have a grasp on the degree of Al’s 
rational capacities: on each day we can say to what degree Al has the rational abilities relevant to 
agency. Given this, we can see that Al is an agent to that same degree. Thus, while the 
categorical concept of agency is vague in Al’s final decade, the scalar concepts are precise. By 
deploying the precise, scalar concepts, we may reflect on Al’s agency and settle on comparative 
and quantitative judgments about it.  
Our scalar concepts are not subject to vagueness in the borderline cases for the 
categorical concept of agency. Even in these cases, we may stably reach comparative and 
quantitative judgments. Moreover, our comparative and quantitative judgments are sensitive to 
small changes in degree of rational capacity. For instance, as Al’s degree of rational capacity 
decreases marginally on each day, his degree of agency similarly decreases marginally. As a 
result of being sensitive to small changes in Al’s rational capacity, the scalar concepts avoid 
drawing sharp but inexplicable lines over when Al is an agent. The scalar concepts thus avoid 
leading to the moral arbitrariness of treating similar individuals as profoundly morally different. 
It is not the case that on one day Al is a moral agent who is accountable for his conduct and able 
to validly exercise the normative powers, but on the next he loses this status. Rather Al’s status 
as a moral agent declines gradually over the course of the decade. The gradual decline in moral 
agency is perfectly explicable in terms of the declines of Al’s rational capacity.  
Not only do the scalar concepts enable us to reach non-arbitrary, explicable judgments 
about Al’s agency, they also enable us to reach further judgments about Al’s responsibility, 
blameworthiness, and the normative powers. We already deploy scalar concepts of responsibility 
and blame. We often represent agents as being more or less responsible for bad behavior and so 




accordingly (i.e., to resent more or less intensely and for a longer or shorter period of time). As a 
result of already deploying scalar concepts of responsibility and blame, by employing scalar 
concepts of agency, we may reach judgments about responsibility and blame without any further 
conceptual change. For instance, recall our case from earlier.  
Al’s Vague Responsibility: Suppose that in the middle of Al’s final decade—when Al’s 
agency is vague—he drives his car and, due to negligence, kills a pedestrian. 
Given that we know to what degree Al possesses the rational abilities relevant for agency, we 
may rationally judge him to be an agent to that degree and to be responsible for his bad behavior 
to that degree. Accordingly, we may rationally settle on resenting Al for his bad behavior to the 
same degree. This enables us to explain why Al is more (less) blameworthy earlier (later) in the 
decade for misconduct. Earlier in the decade, he has a greater degree of rational capacity, and so 
he is more of an agent, and consequently he is more responsible for the misconduct. In this way, 
scalar concepts of agency help us explain facts about moral responsibility. Note that these 
explanations are not ad hoc or disjunctive. The scalar concepts of agency track rational capacity, 
the grounds of agency, in a more fine grained way than the categorical concept. Though we have 
replaced that categorical concept, by deploying the more precise scalar concepts of agency, we 
have vindicated the thought that agency should play an important explanatory role in our moral 
theory.  
Scalar concepts thus provide a more explanatory moral theory. By deploying the scalar 
concept of agency we can see that Al is an agent to some degree, and he is thereby responsible 
and blameworthy to that degree. The scalar concept of agency provides a deeper, more textured 




between agency, responsibility, and blameworthiness. For instance, here are some of the 
quantitative principles we may accept.  
Quantitative Responsibility: An individual is morally responsible for some behavior to 
the degree that they are an agent (all other things being equal). 
Quantitative Blameworthiness: An individual is blameworthy for some bad behavior to 
the degree that they are an agent (all other things being equal). 
The idea behind these quantitative principles is that degree of agency is at least one determinant 
of degree of responsibility and blameworthiness. For instance, if we hold all else fixed and vary 
the degree of agency, we should expect the degree of responsibility and blameworthiness to vary 
accordingly. But these principles do not entail that if two individuals have the same degree of 
agency then their degrees of responsibility and blameworthiness must also be the same.  
Innovation in our concept of agency may require further conceptual innovation in our 
moral theory.24 In the above case we had only to introduce a scalar concept of agency and reflect 
on how it interacts with our extant scalar concepts of responsibility and blameworthiness. When 
it comes to our concept of valid promises, in contrast, we have to make further conceptual 
changes. Recall our other case from earlier: 
Al’s Vague Promise: Suppose that in the middle of Al’s final decade, he says he will give 
his daughter, Beatrice, a ride to the airport so that she can make an important job 
interview. But he ends up cancelling at the last moment for no good reason. Beatrice 
misses her flight and does not get the job. 
 
24 Citing Siegwart, Brun emphasizes that explicating a single theoretically important concept often sets off a chain 
reaction of explications. See Georg Brun, “Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering,” Erkenntnis 81 
(2016): 1235 and Geo Siegwart, “Explikation. Ein methodologischer Versuch,” in Winfried Löffler & Edmund 




I take it we typically deploy a categorical concept of valid promises: A promise to φ is valid just 
in case it generates a moral reason to φ. I propose, however, that we deploy a scalar concept of 
valid promises on which a promise to φ is valid to the degree that it generates a strong reason to 
φ. A more valid promise generates a stronger reason, and a less valid promise generates a weaker 
reason. It is natural enough to think that promises can generate reasons of differing strengths. We 
already distinguish between the strength of reasons arising from different sources. For instance, 
the moral reason not to kill innocent people is much stronger than Al’s reason to take Beatrice to 
the airport. This is because Al needs less justification to permissibly break his promise and not 
take Beatrice to the airport than he does to permissibly kill innocent people. To permissibly 
break his promise, it may be enough that he wakes up with a terrible headache and driving 
Beatrice would cause him a great deal of discomfort.  
Just as we can distinguish between different strengths of reasons arising from different 
sources, so too can we distinguish between different strengths of reasons arising from one 
source. Earlier in the decade Al is more of an agent, and in light of his greater rational capacity, 
it is natural to think that his promises generate stronger reasons for him. By contrast, later in the 
decade, when he has less rational capacity, it is natural to think that his promises generate weaker 
reasons for him.  
We should therefore accept a connection between the scalar concept of valid promises 
and the scalar concept of agency: an individual’s promise is more valid when, and because, they 
are more of an agent (all other things being equal). Given that Al is an agent only to some 
degree, his promise is only valid to that degree, and it generates a correspondingly weaker 
requirement. Here, then, is one way of capturing the connection between agency and the valid 




Quantitative Normative Powers: An individual can validly promise and consent to the 
degree that they are an agent (all other things being equal).25   
According to this principle, agency is part of what fixes the degree to which individuals can 
validly promise and consent. There may be other factors that influence the degree of validity. But 
setting those aside and holding all else equal, degree of agency will fix the degree of validity.  
Given our scalar concepts, we can see that Al’s promise to take Beatrice to the airport is 
valid to the degree that he is an agent. This explains why Al is more blameworthy for violating a 
promise he makes earlier in the decade, and why is he less blameworthy for violating promises 
he makes later in the decade, as his degree of rational capacity decreases. By deploying scalar 
concepts of agency, we can thus settle on judgments about Al’s agency and explain important 
data about his responsibility, blameworthiness, and exercise of the normative powers.  
The scalar proposal thus promises to resolve the conceptual dilemma. On the one hand, 
there are moral pressures that push our categorical concept of agency to be vague, but on the 
other hand, since it is vague, our moral theory is explanatorily limited. The way forward is to 
replace our categorical concept of agency with scalar concepts. By deploying scalar concepts, we 
can ensure that agency plans a central explanatory role in our moral theory.  
4. Three Objections 
The upshot of my view is that for the purposes of moral theory we should replace the categorical 
concepts of agency and the validity of the normative powers with their scalar counterparts. An 
important objection to my view is that vagueness will reappear somewhere in our moral theory 
even if the scalar concepts are precise. In particular, one might suggest, our concepts OUGHT, 
 
25 In my unpublished manuscript, “Scales of Consent,” I develop a scalar approach to valid consent. When a 
consent-giver’s consent to a boundary crossing is more valid, it undermines to a greater degree the general reason 
against crossing their boundary, and when a consent-giver’s consent is less valid, it undermines to a lesser degree 




SHOULD, or RIGHT may remain vague. These concepts do not seem dispensable or marginal to 
moral theory. According to one venerable thought, morality is practical; we inquire into morality 
to become good.26 So our moral theory should provide us with practical guidance: it should tell 
us what is morally right to do. To provide this practical guidance, one might think, our moral 
theory must include a concept (e.g., RIGHT) that has the role of ending deliberation and producing 
action. Moreover, one might think this concept should be categorical. To execute this 
deliberation-ending role, it is natural to think that the concept must flat out categorize some 
actions as to be done.  
Thus, it looks like at least some concepts central to our moral theory must be categorical. 
But how will the deliberation ending categorical concept relate to the scalar concepts of agency, 
responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the normative powers? One might hold that the 
deliberation ending concept will apply only when the scalar concepts meet a certain threshold. 
For instance, one might think that it is wrong to break one’s promise only when one’s promise 
was valid enough. But how valid a promise must be for breaking it to be wrong will sometimes 
be vague. Thus, the objection concludes, the scalar proposal does not help resolve the conceptual 
dilemma and expand the explanatory ambitions of our moral theory. It just pushes the problem 
down the line.  
There are a variety of interesting responses to this objection. One could reject the 
venerable thought that moral theory must be practical. Or one could accept that thought but argue 
that a scalar concept can end deliberation as well as a categorical concept can. For instance, one 
might hold that concepts like RIGHT are (or can and should be) scalar and terminate deliberation 
 
26 This thought goes back at least to Aristotle. See Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in The Complete Works of 




by favoring certain actions to a higher degree.27 More promising, I conjecture, is to argue that 
contrary to first appearances there could be a precise relationship between the scalar concepts 
and the categorical concept that ends deliberation. But I cannot work out and defend any of these 
proposed responses here. I will set all these responses aside and argue that, even if the original 
objection is largely on the right track, its conclusion does not follow.  
Scalar concepts make for a more explanatory moral theory, I have argued. This does not 
require that we purge our moral theory of any vagueness whatsoever. Rather, it requires that the 
scalar concepts do better than their alternatives. I have already argued that the categorical 
concepts are explanatorily limited in the borderline cases, and I have argued that this limitation is 
infectious in our moral theory: not only can we not explain facts about agency, in the borderline 
cases, we also cannot explain related facts about responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the 
normative powers. I conjecture that this argument could be extended to show that in the 
borderline cases we also lack an explanation for what is right. If this conjecture holds, then a 
theory which employs the scalar concepts is strictly better explanatorily. This scalar theory can 
explain facts about agency, responsibility, and the normative powers, and so it has an 
explanatory advantage over the categorical theory. Both theories are on the same footing with 
respect to downstream questions about what is right in the borderline cases: both are 
explanatorily limited here. Overall, then, we should expect that deploying the scalar concepts 
makes for a more explanatory theory, even if we grant that there will be borderline cases for 
what is right on the scalar theory.  
 
27 Some philosophers have recently proposed this kind of scalar approach to moral rightness. See, for instance, 
Alastair Norcross, Morality by Degrees: Reasons without Demands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). One of 
the most pressing worries for scalar approaches to rightness just is whether the scalar concepts can effectively end 
deliberation. So the suggestion in the text is promising to the extent that this worry can be confronted head on by 




Moving on to the next objection, I have claimed that AGENT has an important role in our 
moral theory: its role is to explain (among other things) how individuals are responsible and able 
to validly exercise the normative powers. But one might object that AGENT does not have this 
important explanatory role. If this objection succeeds, then my motivation for deploying a scalar 
concept of agency in moral theory is undercut. Agency is no more explanatorily important to our 
moral theory than heaps or baldness. That there is vagueness and arbitrariness in when to apply 
HEAP and BALD should not worry moral theorists because these concepts do not play a central role 
in moral theory. Similarly, if AGENT does not have an explanatory role to play in moral theory, 
there is no reason to revise what concepts we deploy in moral theory in light of it being vague. 
Let’s consider a case where it might appear that factors other than agency are 
explanatorily central. In particular, we will consider a case where one’s ability to validly exercise 
the normative power of consent varies, even while their degree of agency is held fixed. This 
example will not involve the normative power of promising, but nevertheless the point arguably 
generalizes to promising.  
Intoxication: Suppose Candice has several alcoholic drinks. If she consents to get a tattoo 
because she is drunk, then it seems that her consent is not valid. But if she consents to 
letting her friend stay to watch an extra episode of their favorite tv show because she is 
drunk, her consent seems valid. Her friend, for instance, is not trespassing.  
It might not be obvious that Candace is consenting because she is drunk. To make it clearer, we 
can suppose that normally Candace and her friend have a set schedule for watching their tv 
show, and they do not go over it because they both have to wake up early for work in the 




Intoxication we hold fixed Candice’s rational capacities and so her degree of agency is also held 
fixed, but nevertheless it seems that there is variation in what she can validly consent to. 
         In Intoxication, risk is the natural factor that seems to explain the variation in what 
Candice can validly consent to. Because the stakes seem higher when it comes to getting a tattoo, 
we are not comfortable with saying that Candace can consent (to a high degree) unless her 
rational capacities are intact (to a high degree). In contrast, all that is at stake in allowing her 
friend to stay over is an hour of lost sleep, and so we are comfortable with the thought that 
Candace can validly consent (to a high degree) to letting her friend stay over, even while her 
rational capacities are diminished. Similar cases arise for the normative power of promising, 
when one’s ability to validly promise varies more with the stakes than with rational capacity.  
The lesson we should draw from Intoxication is not that agency is explanatorily irrelevant 
to the validity of the normative powers. Rather, we should conclude that it is one factor among 
others. Risk or the stakes may also make a difference, and this factor may modulate the 
relationship between the rational capacities and the valid exercise of the normative powers. So 
ultimately we may retain the view that agency has an important explanatory role in our theory 
after all. In fact we can even maintain our original principle about its explanatory role. Setting 
aside other factors, or holding all else equal, the validity of the normative powers tracks the 
degree of agency.  
Quantitative Normative Powers: An individual can validly promise and consent to the 
degree that they are an agent (all other things being equal).  
In Intoxication all other things are not equal—there is another relevant factor—because there is a 




A third and final objection concerns my preferred framing of conceptual change. One 
might argue that as a matter of fact moral theorists already possess the scalar concepts, and so it 
is incorrect to describe my proposal to deploy the scalar concepts as one of conceptual change. 
Rather, what the proposal requires is for us to properly understand the concepts we already have: 
at least some of these concepts are not categorical but scalar.  
To support the thought that we already possess scalar concepts, one could observe that it 
is grammatical to speak of one individual being more of an agent than another, and it is also 
grammatical to describe an individual as an agent to some degree. These observations may lead 
one to conclude that English speakers already possess scalar concepts of agency.  
But this conclusion is too quick. All that follows from the grammatical observation is that 
English speakers are linguistically able to express scalar concepts of agency. In other words, 
English speakers are in a position to deploy these concepts. Scalar concepts of agency are 
accessible to English speakers. But that a concept is accessible to a subject does not mean that 
the subject possesses it, let alone deploys it. To reply to this objection, then, I will first make 
clear why the accessibility of a concept does not entail its possession. This limits the impact of 
linguistic data, like the grammaticality of “more of an agent.” Second, even if subjects possess a 
concept, I will reiterate my claim that there is a further important question concerning whether 
they deploy the concept in a theory. This further question is what matters for developing an 
explanatory moral theory of agency, responsibility, and the normative powers. We need not only 
to possess the right concepts but to deploy them.  
Consider that young children may possess and deploy concepts of direction and 
magnitude. As a result, the concept of a vector (i.e., a quantity with magnitude and direction) is 




whether they possess this concept. Many children may only come to possess the concept of a 
vector through studying mathematics or physics, even while this concept has been accessible to 
them for some time. Moreover, once this concept is integrated into one’s conceptual repertoire, it 
is a further issue whether they deploy the concept in service of some theory. 
For instance, suppose that Jane is learning the theory of the natural numbers. She has a 
good grasp of addition and multiplication with the natural numbers. At this stage, the concept of 
a vector is accessible to Jane. Suppose one day in school Jane’s teacher gives a standalone lesson 
on vectors; after being introduced to vectors through definition, Jane works on a few exercises 
involving vector addition and multiplication. Here Jane seems to possess the concept of a vector, 
and she has deployed this concept in working on the exercises. But suppose that after this lesson, 
Jane’s teacher returns to arithmetic for the rest of the semester, and so Jane does not deploy the 
concept again until next year when she takes geometry. In the meantime, Jane continues to 
possess the concept of a vector, though she has not deployed it in working out a mathematical 
theory. Instead, she has been deploying concepts of magnitude, addition, and multiplication and 
working out the theory of the natural numbers. Next year, when it is time to deploy the concept 
of a vector in geometry, it is fair to say of Jane that she will change which concepts she has been 
using in mathematics. Before she was in the habit of deploying concepts of magnitude in 
studying mathematics, but now she must deploy her concept of a vector. Partly as a result of this 
conceptual change, the resulting mathematical theory that Jane learns will look very different. 
Returning to moral theory, it may be that moral philosophers possess the scalar concepts 
already, or it may be that these concepts are merely accessible to them. In either case, there is a 
further question whether they deploy these concepts in working out their moral theory. As I 




concepts. Whether we deploy the scalar concepts makes an important difference to the resulting 
theory. In particular, I have argued, scalar concepts lead to a more explanatory moral theory.28 
5. Conclusion 
Moral theory faces a conceptual dilemma. On the one hand, since our AGENT is vague, its 
explanatoriness is limited in the borderline cases. On the other hand, if central moral concepts 
like AGENT were precise, we would seem forced to accept moral arbitrariness. On the view I have 
defended, we should replace certain categorical moral concepts with scalar concepts. Switching 
to categorical concepts enables us to avoid being impaled on the second horn of the dilemma. 
Precise scalar concepts need not lead to arbitrariness: in deploying them, we need not draw sharp 
but arbitrary cutoffs.   
 I have discussed the conceptual dilemma for our concept of agency in particular. But this 
conceptual dilemma can be raised quite generally for concepts that play a central role in any 
theory given two conditions are met. First, the current concept must be categorical. Second, the 
 
28 At this point, one could object that in fact moral theorists have been deploying the scalar concepts all along. It 
appears from their writing and theories that moral theorists typically use categorical concepts of agency. But this 
appearance is misleading because these moral theorists mistakenly treat their scalar concepts as categorical when 
they explicate them in their theories. The moral theorists have been deploying the scalar concepts incompetently, 
making it look like they are deploying categorical concepts. It is understandable that moral theorists have this 
conceptual incompetency; moral theory is difficult and complex, and treating one’s concepts as categorical may help 
to simplify their theory. I have been assuming that to deploy a concept involves a basic degree of competency with 
the concept, but to respond to this objection I will concede that it is possible to deploy a concept incompetently (e.g., 
treating scalar concepts as if they are categorical). (Though I am conceding this possibility, that it is indeed a 
possibility is arguable. In particular, there is an argument from interpretivism about concept deployment to rule it 
out. According to this kind of interpretivism, for a subject S to deploy a concept C is for it to be part of the best 
interpretation of S that S deploys C. Given a principle of charity, it will not be part of the best interpretation of moral 
theorists that they are making egregious mistakes about the nature of the concepts they deploy. A better 
interpretation is that they are deploying different concepts which they have a good grasp on.) If we somehow 
discover that this possibility is realized, I am happy for my proposal to be reinterpreted. In this case, my proposal 
would not be that we should change what concepts we merely deploy in moral theory. Rather, my proposal would be 
that we should change what concepts we competently deploy in moral theory. To competently deploy a concept in 
this sense does not require that we not make substantive mistakes about when it applies. Rather, competently 
deploying a concept just involves not misunderstanding the basic shape of the concept (e.g., whether it is categorical 
or scalar). Before I had been assuming that deploying a concept involves competently deploying it, but on the 
possibility raised by the objection, these two things can come apart, and so my proposal is best put in terms of a call 
for competently deploying the scalar concepts. If we competently deploy the scalar concepts, we can develop a more 
explanatory moral theory. This is the key payoff of my proposal, and it will be preserved regardless of whether we 




concept must be vague because its application depends on a vague threshold being met on a 
scale. Given these conditions, on the one hand, sticking with the vague categorical concept will 
be costly to the extent that we want the concept to play an explanatory role in the theory that is 
curbed by borderline cases. On the other hand, precisifying the categorical concept will be costly 
to the extent that we do not want our theory to commit us to arbitrariness in whether the 
categorical concept applies. When both these options are costly, it will be promising to replace 
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